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At the time of writing this note, in
December 1965, there is still some uncertainty about
the final result of the year 1965 for the Irish
economy.     It is, however, clear that some of the
projections given in the Second Programme for Economic
Expansion Progress Report for 1964 (in future referred
to as the Progress Report) have to be revised in the
light of experience gained in the course of the year.
The first task to be undertaken, before making
projections for 1966, will, therefore, be to obtain
a 1965 basis and to consider its implications.
It will be assumed that public authoritiest
current expenditure and gross fixed capital formation
at both current and constant prices, and personal
expenditure at current prices, do not turn out to be
substantially different from the levels envisaged in
the Progress Report; the figures given therein for
the items mentioned will, therefore, be used.    In so
far as these and other assumptions prove unrealistic,
the 1966 projections given later may be correspondingly
adjusted.
The element of price increase in personal
expenditure is, however, assumed to be 5% and thus
somewhat higher than that implied in the Progress
Report; the increase in real personal expenditure is
consequently lower.
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Furthermore, merchandise imports and exports
for the first three quarters of 1965 are known.
Imports in the fourth quarter of 1965 are assumed to
be the same as in the corresponding 1964 period.
Exports exceeded their 1964 level by ~1 million in
October and a similar excess is assumed for November
and December.    Invisible imports (including corrections
of merchandise imports for balance of payments purposes)
are taken as ~46 million as in the Progress Report;
invisible exports are assumed to be ~148 million, a
little higher than originaliy projected.     The
implied price increase in imports and exports of all
goods and services is taken as 2~o.     Finally, stock-
building is put at ~18 million as in 1964, above the
Progress Report projection, indicating higher cattle
stocks.    The result is as follows:
Current prices: ~ mill. 1958 prices : ~ rail
Category 1965 1965
1964
Progress Present
1964 Progress Pres
Report Estimate Report Esti~
I,    ,
Personal
expenditure 660 711 711 564 586 57
Government
expenditure 116 19.3 88 90
Fixed capital
formation 175 200 CO0 151 166 16
Stockbuilding +18 +12 +18 +16 +I0 +1
Exports 361 382 370 318 326 32
Total 1,330 1,428 1,422 1,137 1,178 1,17
Imports 392 412 415 369 379 38
Gross national
product 938 1,016 1,007 768 ¯ 799 78
Total 1,330 1,428 1,422 1,137 1,178 1,17
One implication of this set of estimates is
that real gross national product appears to have
increased by about 2~ between 1964 and--1965, instead of
by 4% as envisaged in the Progress Report.     Furthermore,
a balance of payments deficit of ~45 million is
estimated; earlier in the year the anticipated de fici%
came to ~50 million, but the policy measures adopted
may have had some effect on the level of imports.
It may be noted that the increase in imports
between 1964 and 1965 is not much above that of the
Progress Report projection and seems, indeed, to be
very much in keeping with the increase in total final
demand.     The unforeseen factor which is chiefly
responsible for the excess of the balance of payments
deficit over the originally projected £30 million is
the stagnation in merchandise exports (in real terms a
decline), implying only a slight rise in exports of
goods and services at current prices.     In such
circumstances, an increased unfavourable trade balance
and payments balance seem inevitable, in the absence of
any mechanism which would produce a quick adjustment.
When it comes to assessing the outlook for
1966, new problems arise, since economic activity in
Ireland is likely to be influenced by a number of
unknown factors.     Such factors are: credit supply,
government current and capital expenditure~ the
national wage agreement, the Irish and British import
levies~ the Free Trade agreement, new manufacturing
projects and associated capital inflow.     Some of these
are at least partly within the power of the government
to determine; in the case of other factors, the
information about their operation¯ and effect should in an~r
event be known to the government before anyone else.
If various alternative possibilities are
considered, the results obtained may be fairly wide
apart°     it is possible to make a medium projection of
what seems likely to result in normal circumstances~
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in the absence of special policy measures. A
medium set of assumptions includes the virtual
disappearance of the British and Irish import levies
but no further drastic move towards free trade in the
course of 1966, and a more moderate rise in incomes and
prices produced by the next wage agreement than by that
of 1964.
A basic quantitative assumption will be made
to the effect that total final demand at current prices
will be about 7~% higher in 1966 than in 1965.
Bxperience based on econometric relations and other
considerations suggests then that the increase may
amount to 7% for personal and government expenditure,
8% for fixed capital formation and 10% for exports,
with stockbuilding at ~12 million~     Price increases
may account for about 1% in the case of exports and
3% in the case of other demand categories.
Because of the crucial role which exports
will play in the performance of the economy in 1966,
they have been subjected to a more detailed analysis.
For this purpose, merchandise exports have been broken
down into broad groups by category and by destination.
It is then estimated that whilst total merchandise
exports remained at the same level in 1964 and 1965,
some changes in composition took place. In particular
the value of cattle exports in 1965 is estimated to be
~8 million or 12% below the 1964 figure, whilst exports
of manufactured goods to countries other than the
United Kingdom appear to be £6 million or 37~ higher.
For 1966 the following developments appear
most likely.     The recovery in cattle and beef exports
which is already apparent should continue, giving 1966
exports in volume terms rather above the 1964 total,
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and as average prices are also likely to be higher than
at that time, the value of Cattle and beef exports may
be expected to be around £5 million higher than in 1964.
Manufactures’ exports to the United Kingdom are affected
both by the U.K. import levy and by arrangements which
may be made under the Free Trade Area discussions;
accordingly they may either be near the 1964 level o~
substantially above,     Other exports to the U,K~ are
less affected by the levy but could benefit from free
trade proposals.     Exports to other countries,
particularly of manufactures, should continue to rise
though at a slower rate than in 1965.
The results of these considerations may be
summarised as follows, giving minimum and maximum estimates
for 1966:
Category and
destination
Total cattle (live
and meat)
Value of exports (£ million)
To the United Kingdom:
Other food~ drink
and tobacco
Manufactured goods
Miscellaneous (incl.
re-exports )
To other countries:
Other food, drink
and tobacco
Manufactured goods
Miscellaneous
Total merchandise
1966 estimates
1964
1965
estimate
minimum maximum
69.1 61.0 72 77
55 .9 57.1 58 61
37.7 36.2 38 43
13.1 15.1 16 17
14.5 14.7 15 14
16.6 22.7 28 97
15.5 15.3 16 16
222.4 222.1 243 255
Visible exports can therefore be expected to
rise in value somewhere between 10% and 15% from 1965
to 1966.     With regard to invisible items, the most
plausible forecast would appear to be a continuation
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of the steady rise by 64 - 7% per annum which was
obtained recently, which would give a 1966 total of
~158 million.     The likely range of all exports at
current prices in 1966 thus seems to be from ~01
million to ~413 million, or from 8~-% to 11½% above the
1965 figure.     A 107o increase thus constitutes indeed
a medium forecast.
With a 7%~ increase in total final demand,
imports of goods and services at current prices may be
expected to be about 9~ higher, and gross national
product almost 7~ higher, in 1966 than in 1965.     Of
these increases, about 2~o would be accounted for by
rising prices in the case of imports and somewhat
above 3~o in the case of gross national product.     This
implies a growth rate in real gross national product of
about 3~-~o between 1965 and 1966.    The projected set
of national accounts data is as follows:
Category
Personal expenditure
Government expenditure
Fixed capital formation
Stockbuilding
Exports
1966 (~ million)
Current
prices
761
131
216
+12
40~
To tal
Imports
Gross national product
Total
1,527
452
1,075
1,527
1958
prices
602
93
174
+i0
345
I, 224
409
815
1,224
It may be noted that this projection implies a
balance of payments deficit of the same order of
magnitude as that likely to be incurred in 1965.     To
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some extent, of course, the correct answer to the
question "how large will be the deficit in the current
account of the balance of payments in 19667" is "as
large as the government permits it to be".     Some
risk of curtailing the economy’s growth is of course
involved.
Among the possible governmental policy
measures, credit restriction and its consequences are
familiar enough: a decline in the purchase of consumer
durables, in employment and in construction output.
The first of these effects may be necessary, the other
two are not.     The objective of restraining consumer
demand can be satisfied without incurring the undesirable
side effects of credit restriction, by imposing sales
taxes on cumsumer goods.     If these taxes are further
designed to discriminate against consumer goods with
a high import content, they will simultaneously perform
the function of an import levy.
Again, a rapidly rising price level affects
the balance of payments, apart from its redistributive
effect.     If an effective curb on prices can be
maintained, inflationary increases in money incomes may
be minimise d.
~ven without special policy measures, the
tentative conclusion of a £45 million balance of
payments deficit may be modified by the operation of
one or more of the following factors: a quicker
levelling off with regard to investment and thus a
lesser rise in imports; more favourable terms of trade;
or a greater expansion of the export volume.     Import
substitution appears to be a continuous process which must
make itself felt in the future but which has a limited
effect in the short run.
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